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The Challenge to Democracy
The democratic way of life is being challenged 
today all over the world. Its superiority is widely 
denied and its security is seriously imperiled. The 
American people consequently are interested in 
understanding the dangers that confront them and 
in guarding against them. Democracy needs 
strengthening both internally and externally, and 
farm people can and must and will help do the 
job, both because of their numbers and because 
they know perhaps better than any other group 
the meaning of the democratic way of life.
It is the purpose of this bulletin and others in 
its series to show what produced the present sit­
uation and suggest some of the things that need to 
be done about it— not by farm people alone but by 
rural America and urban America working to­
gether. This is the fifth of eight bulletins on the 
subject. They deal with the following topics:
Democracy on trial.
How much centralization in government?
The place of the family farm.
The test of citizenship.
Democracy and nationalism.
Toward a new rural statesmanship.
Improving public administration.
The machine and democracy.
On cover, League of Nations in special session as France’s condemnation o f German 
rearmament was read, April 16, 1936. Press Association, Inc., Photo.
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The Challenge to Democracy
V. Democracy and Nationalism1
B y  C . H . M a t t e r s o n 2
Modern democracy and modern nationalism are two de­
velopments which the men of today have inherited from 
the nineteenth century. They have developed concurrently 
over the past century and a half and on occasions have 
appeared to be not only complementary but even necessary 
to each other. Today the very existence of democracy ap­
pears to be threatened by the excesses of nationalism. It is 
the purpose of this bulletin to consider how this has come 
about in order to understand the problem with which this 
generation is confronted.
THE NATURE OF NATIONALISM
Democracy has been defined elsewhere in this series, but 
what is meant by “ nationalism” needs, perhaps, some con­
sideration. Nationalism is difficult to define, and the diffi­
culty lies in the fact that it exists in varying degrees. In all 
forms it can be said to be a group feeling. This group is 
generally characterized by an historical tradition, language, 
literature, customs and values which are common to its 
members. The appreciation of a common cultural heritage 
and a common past is the fundamental bond which holds 
together the members of a nation. It is, however, only the 
first stage in the development of nationalistic feeling. From 
this it develops generally into an affection for a given area 
of land and the idea of a “ fatherland” for which, if neces­
sary, one would be willing to fight. Political independence 
for the group soon becomes a goal, the achievement of which 
becomes a national aspiration. If and when independence 
is achieved it is apt to be several generations after the first 
stage of national development, and it is at this point that 
nationalism becomes both constructive and dangerous.
1This bulletin is fifth o f a series on The Challenge to Democracy prepared by 
members o f the History and Government Department, Iowa State College, 
instructor in History and Government.
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It is constructive when —  as has often happened —  it 
operates in conjunction with democracy to inspire a people 
to establish democratic principles as the basis of the politi­
cal institutions of their new national state. Inspiration 
comes from the martyrs and heroes that a struggle for in­
dependence generally gives to a nation. Nearly every nation 
has had its George Washington or its “minute men” whom 
it honors for their role in its national history. Respect, 
which often verges upon worship, for some one individual 
is an important part of the development of pride in a na­
tion’s past.
Such pride is often justifiable, but it can, when carried 
to extremes, turn nationalism into dangerous paths. Na­
tional pride often leads to a blind refusal to admit that 
errors have been made, and a refusal to-admit that mistakes 
have been made in the past leaves little hope for improve­
ment in the future. Each nation, with its heroes and 
achievements of which it is justifiably proud, is likely to 
fail to appreciate that other nations have similar achieve­
ments and similar pride. This becomes the basis o f the most 
extreme form o f nationalism, the super-race idea. This is 
the belief that, since one’s nation has achieved so much in 
the past, it is a chosen people, destined to dominate the 
family of nations. Not all nations reach the super-race 
stage, but there is ample current evidence that some do. 
There is no fast rule as to speed of development through 
these stages of nationalism, but by 1914 a large, number of 
national groups in Europe had reached the stage of demand­
ing political independence.. ...........
By 1914 democracy had had a century-long career of 
gradual successes. The United States had been a democracy 
for over 100 years ; Great Britain had at last achieved uni­
versal manhood suffrage in 1884 ; France was a republic, 
Italy a constitutional monarchy ; Germany and Austria- 
Hungary had their elected legislative bodies whose powers 
were restricted but whose prospects for further democratic 
development appeared good ; even in Russia the first signs 
of a democratic form of government were being seen in the 
newly-established Duma. In the various struggles of the
4
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nineteenth century, democracy could claim the loyalties of 
many men over even nationalism in the people who left 
their native lands, especially in central Europe, to come to 
the new world to gain a freedom that did not seem to be 
attainable at home.
NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY IN THE WAR OF 
1914-1918
The war of 1914-18 seemed to bring both of these develop­
ments to a climax. At its beginning the contending powers 
were lined up purely on a basis of national or imperial inter­
ests, but after 1917, when autocratic Russia dropped out 
and the United States entered, the war gained at least the 
appearance of a struggle between the democracies and the 
countries in which democracy was limited. Two great re­
publics, the United States and France, and two monarchies 
in which an elected representative body was the center of 
power, Great Britain and Italy, were the leaders of an alli­
ance struggling against monarchies in which the role of 
elected legislatures was secondary. The appearance then 
of a struggle in behalf of democracy was real enough, and 
the American people could easily believe President Wilson’s 
famous statement, made in all sincerity, that America was 
fighting in the war in order “to make the world safe for 
democracy.” In the light of later developments.it is diffi­
cult to refrain from cynicism when one recalls the famous 
slogan of that war, but the fact remains that the sincere 
enthusiasm that it aroused, especially in the United States, 
for a grand crusade in behalf of a political ideal was a 
testimony of belief in democracy. Indeed, the height of the 
enthusiasm and- the sincerity of the idealism of . that time 
has made the later bitterness and cynicism all the greater.
Another phrase, popularized by President Wilson, during 
the last months of that war was, “ the self-determination of 
peoples.”  This was the principle that national groups should 
have the right to decide for themselves under what govern­
ment they would live. There were many people in Europe 
to whom such a principle made a great appeal. The Poles, 
Czechs, Slovaks and southern Slavs among others were such.
5
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All had been under governments dominated by some other 
nationality, and all had reached the stage of demanding 
political independence. By proclaiming “ the self-determina­
tion of peoples”  as one of the bases of a future peace settle­
ment, President Wilson was promising these peoples that 
their national aspirations would be realized in an allied vic­
tory. Thus the cause of the allies took on the appearance 
of being the cause of both democracy and nationalism and, 
when triumph came in the fall of 1918, many believed that 
both had achieved their goals.
THE VICTORY OF 1918
The winning of a war is one thing and the making of 
peace is another, and it was not long before the ideals which 
had been preached during the war were being either for­
gotten or distorted by the diplomats. National interests — 
and obviously those of the victors only —  were the para­
mount considerations in the minds of most of the peace­
makers.
This is not hard to understand. In the course of any 
war, and especially of a long one, national feelings are 
aroused to a fever pitch. Extreme glorification of one’s own 
nation and equally extreme hatred of the enemy is preached 
on all sides. It is too much to expect that when the guns 
cease firing people will suddenly cease hating. Thus, a 
peace treaty, drawn up immediately after a war, is not apt 
to reflect a sincere desire to prevent future wars or even to 
make a fair settlement all around but rather to gain revenge 
for the past war and to establish one’s own nation in the 
most powerful position possible for the future. An election 
in Great Britain was won in December 1918 by an over­
whelming majority for the Lloyd George coalition on a plat­
form of “ Hang the Kaiser and make Germany pay for the 
war,”  neither of which, obviously, could be done. The poli­
cies of the other countries, with the exception of the United 
States which had renounced any annexations or indemnities, 
were similar to the British attitude.
6
Bulletin P, Vol. 1, No. 25 [1941], Art. 1
http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/bulletinp/vol1/iss25/1
691
THE “ SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES”
The conflict between the idealism of President Wilson and 
the realism” of the European statesmen resulted in a series 
of peace treaties which were at best a compromise. It was 
soon evident, even to President Wilson, that nationalism, 
once encourged as it had been during the war, is not easily 
moderated. The complex character of the nationality prob­
lem and the extreme ambitions of the various national groups 
made it impossible to satisfy even all the victors not to men­
tion drawing up peace terms which might be palatable to 
the defeated nations. The principle of “ self-determination” 
was applied when it would benefit the victors, but it was 
forgotten when it would benefit the vanquished. There were 
countless examples of this, of which Italy’s claim to the 
Tyrol, Poland’s to the Corridor and Danzig, and Rumania’s 
to all of Transylvania were but a few. The request of Austria 
to be incorporated into republican Germany was refused 
because of French national interests. The credit for that 
unification of German peoples fell to the Nazi dictatorship 
instead of the German republic.
Much has been made by many men, ranging from Wood- 
row Wilson to Adolf Hitler, of the glaring weaknesses of 
the Versailles treaty. For our purposes, however, it must 
be pointed out that progress was made toward satisfying 
the demands of the principle of nationalism. In 1914 there 
had been, roughly, 60 million people in Europe under the 
rule of some alien nationality; as a result of the Versailles 
arrangements that number was reduced to 20 million. 
Twenty million dissatisfied people are not to be overlooked 
by any means, but the satisfaction of the nationalistic hopes 
of twice that number was no mean achievement. Certainly 
political boundaries and national boundaries, although still 
far from perfect, were “ in closer accord than they had ever 
been since nationalism had first become a vital force.” 
Furthermore, there was still hope that the remaining prob­
lems could be settled peaceably through the new instrument 
for settling international problems, the League of Nations. 
President Wilson gave way to the nationalist desires of the 
allies because he expected that the League would later, in
7
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calmer times, remedy the “wrongs of Versailles.” General 
Smuts, the South African delegate at the Conference, best 
expressed this hope at the time. “There are territorial set­
tlements,”  he said, “which will need revision . . . .  There are 
indemnities stipulated which cannot be executed without 
grave injury to the industrial revival of Europe, and which 
will be in the interests of all to render more tolerable and 
moderate . . .  and I am confident that the League of Nations 
will yet prove the path of escape for Europe out of the ruin 
brought about by this war.” Nationalism then had won the 
peace so completely that hope for a lasting peace still lay in 
the future.
“ SAFE FOR DEMOCRACY”
And what of democracy? Even before the armistice 
President Wilson had given some reality to the idea that a 
victory for the allies would be a victory for democracy also 
by insisting that the allies would deal only with a govern­
ment which could claim to represent the German people. 
A revolution in Germany produced a democratic form of 
government and eventually resulted in the Weimar republic 
which Hitler destroyed 15 years later. Similarly, demo­
cratic forms were set up in the new states which nationalism 
had created ranging from Finland to Yugoslavia. Parts of 
eastern Europe and nearly all of central Europe where 
Tsars and Emperors had played the major roles now seemed 
to have been won for democracy. The appearance, especially 
in some of the smaller nations where cliques of army officers 
or of wealthy landowners or industrialists rather quickly 
seized control of the democratic machinery, was somewhat 
deceiving, but it seemed reasonable to hope that, in time, 
these nations would develop along democratic lines. Cer­
tainly more people were living under democratic forms of 
government than had ever done so before. The victory of 
democracy seemed to be as complete, if not as dangerous, 
as that of nationalism.
BETWEEN THE WARS
What then caused the high hopes of 1920 to prove so ter­
ribly vain in 1940? The answer has already been touched
8
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upon, namely, the continuance of rabid nationalistic feeling 
long after the war. This, it will be remembered, was to be 
checked by the League of Nations. It was the hope of the 
sponsors of the League that it would attract the loyalty and 
devotion which people had hitherto accorded to their respec­
tive nations. It was, indeed, a vain hope. None of the vic­
torious powers was willing to make the sacrifices which 
would have to be made if the League were to be a success. 
The defeated powers were not asked to join, a fact which 
immediately gave the League the appearance of being 
merely a continuation of the alliance which had won the war 
rather than an international organization designed to pre­
serve peace and international goodwill. American national­
ism showed itself in our flat refusal to join the League, even 
with reservations. America was going to “ return to nor­
malcy” and “ normalcy” to many Americans meant with­
drawing completely from European affairs. The crusading 
impulse which had been so strong during the war gave way 
to a strong isolationism. It was claimed by many —  a claim 
which sounds rather hollow today —  that America had no 
interest in European affairs and should not concern itself 
with trying to settle Europe’s quarrels. The often-made 
assertion that America’s refusal to join the League neces­
sarily doomed that organization to failure and thereby made 
us responsible for much that has happened in the past 10 
years can never be proved. Too many “ ifs” are involved to 
reach any definite conclusion, but it is clear that our refusal 
either to join the League or to make a special treaty with 
France made France look to guarantees of security other 
than the League and enabled France to turn the League into 
an instrument of her own national policy.
FRENCH NATIONALISM AND GERMAN DEMOCRACY
Through the early 1920’s French policy concentrated on 
keeping Germany a second-rate power. This policy rested 
on several things. First, there was the use of the League 
of Nations, not to maintain world peace but to maintain the 
treaty of Versailles. This use was, of course, the exact 
opposite of the use to which President Wilson had hoped 
the League would be put. Second, a system of alliances was
9
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developed involving Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and 
Yugoslavia, all of whom had much at stake in the preserva­
tion of the Versailles treaty. Alliance systems were consid­
ered one of the fundamental causes of the war of 1914, and 
the League was supposed to eliminate them, but by 1925 
France had ringed Germany with allies. Third, France 
maintained a large standing army of over 500,000 men which 
she insisted was necessary even though Germany was lim­
ited to 100,000 men. All attempts at disarmament, to which 
the League members were committed, were blocked by 
France and her allies. Finally, Germany was to be kept 
weak economically by the imposition of an exhorbitant rep­
aration and indemnity bill and by the use of firm methods 
in collecting the huge sums.
It was, perhaps, in the latter two points that the real 
danger to democracy lay. Germany, in spite of her defeat, 
was potentially one of the strongest nations in the world. 
She had enjoyed the status of a “ Great Power” ; she had, for 
good or evil, stood o ff almost singlehandedly, the major part 
of the civilized world for 4 years. German nationalism had 
been aroused as much as French or British or Polish or any 
other, and merely because she was the defeated power one 
could not expect her to forget her own national pride. Ger­
many was certainly the most important nation in central 
Europe. There, if anywhere, it was to be hoped that democ­
racy would not only survive but thrive. The Weimar con­
stitution provided a good start; it was, indeed, one of the 
most democratic constitutions in the world. It was appar­
ent, however, that democracy would need every possible 
encouragement. Conservative groups on the one side and 
Communist groups on the other sought to undermine the 
new republic. The former charged the new government 
with humiliating Germany by signing the disastrous treaty 
of Versailles. Furthermore, it was this government that 
had to incur the odium attached to raising the large sums of 
money which had to be paid by the already bankrupt nation 
to the allies for reparations.
The climax came when France illegally occupied the Ruhr 
district, the industrial heart of Germany, as a measure to
10
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force Germany to pay. The Ruhr occupation had two im­
portant, long-range results. It renewed the hatred and bit­
terness of the German people toward the French, and it 
served as the final factor in producing the great inflation 
of the German currency in 1923. Before this wild inflation 
was over it took a billion German marks to buy a dollar’s 
worth of goods. For many people it meant that the savings 
of a lifetime were wiped out at a stroke, and the middle class, 
an important element in any democracy, was practically 
ruined. Many of the later recruits of the Nazi movement 
were the sons of the middle class families who had seen their 
futures collapse along with the value of the mark. Foreign 
loans, through the agency of the Dawes Plan, staved off 
immediate disaster, but the seeds that were sown were des­
tined in a few years to bear bitter fruit and to make the job 
of the democratic leaders within Germany all the more dif­
ficult. Democracy now, besides being associated with defeat 
in war, was associated with economic collapse in peace. 
Nationalist groups in Germany were making their appear­
ance and in their propaganda were definitely linking na­
tional humiliation with democracy. It was at this time, 
November 1923, that the Nazi party made its first bid for 
recognition in the famous “ Beer Hall Putsch.”
Stresemann, the German Foreign Minister, sought conces­
sions from the allies. Concessions were made, especially 
during those periods when Briand was directing French for­
eign policy, but they were generally “too little and too late” 
to satisfy the reborn German nationalism which was being 
stirred up by Hitler, at that time relatively unknown and 
taken seriously by very few. Stresemann himself, who 
labored hard to gain a real diplomatic victory which could 
be credited to the republic, summed up the situation in 
April 1929, which was considerably before the threat of 
the Nazis was taken seriously elsewhere. “ If you had given 
me one concession,” he said in an interview with the Eng­
lishman, Lockhart, “ I could have carried my people. I could 
still do it today. But you have given me nothing, and the 
trifling concessions which you have made have always come 
too late. In their private conversations your diplomatists,
11
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your Ministers are friendly and full of promises but in pub­
lic, at Geneva, everywhere they fall into line with the French 
and it is by their public actions that I must judge them. 
Patience, they say, and all will be well. But they cannot see 
that the ground here is slipping away under my feet.
“ Nothing remains now except brute force,” he added. 
“The future is in the hands of the new generation, and the 
youth of Germany, which we might have won for peace and 
for the new Europe, we both have lost. That is my tragedy 
and your crime.”3 Stresemann was, perhaps putting upon 
the allies more than their share of the blame for the develop­
ment of extreme nationalism and of disdain for democracy 
in Germany, but there is no doubt that their share was a 
large one.
The example of the effect of nationalism in France upon 
democracy in Germany has been cited at some length be­
cause it is the clearest illustration of what happened to de­
mocracy in a world that had just been made safe for it. 
To a lesser degree the same sort of thing happened in the 
Danube valley, especially to Austria who found herself cut 
o ff from her neighbors by high tariff barriers and became 
an outstanding victim of economic nationalism. As such 
she easily fell a prey to the dictatorship of Dollfuss even 
before Hitler annexed the country to form his “ Greater 
Germany.”
NATIONALISM IN ITALY
All this, however, cannot explain the disappearance of 
democracy in Italy. Italy was one of the victorious powers 
who supposedly had waged and won the war for democracy. 
Italy, however, had never pretended to believe in the crusade 
for democracy. She had entered the war for frankly imper­
ialistic reasons and definitely expected to be paid for her 
efforts by new lands in Europe and colonies in Africa. When 
her statesmen returned from the peace conference with only 
slight territorial gains, they were charged with inability to 
protect Italy s national interests. The treaties of 1919 were 
viewed with almost as much bitterness in Italy as in Ger-
®Lockhart, Bruce. Retreat from glory.
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many, and the government which had agreed to them —  as a 
matter of fact it could have done little else —  quickly lost 
the confidence of the people. A sense of outraged national­
ism along with the social and economic distress of the de­
pression of 1921, in dealing with which there was an utter 
lack of leadership on the part of the government, produced 
a willingness to abandon what was considered a static de­
mocracy for the dynamic program of Fascism.
THE FAILURE OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS
From this very sketchy survey of recent events, it appears 
that those who thought that democracy had come into its 
own in 1920 were'sadly mistaken or were lulled into a false 
sense of security. Hope such as that expressed by General 
Smuts had no reasonable basis. The League succeeded in 
settling only disputes between lesser powers, and when a 
great power felt that its “national honor”  was at stake it 
refused to submit the question to the League.
Italy set the example for flouting the League in the Corfu 
Incident in 1924. Japan followed suit in the Manchurian 
Affair in 1932. The next year Germany withdrew from the 
League, and 2 years later Italy disregarded the League in 
the Ethiopian Crisis. After that it was apparent, even , to 
the most optimistic supporter of the League, that there was 
little to be hoped from it.
The failure of the League to inspire confidence was well 
illustrated in its attempts at disarmament. The treaty of 
Versailles had stated that the compulsory disarmament of 
Germany was merely a prelude to a general disarmament. 
Large armies would, if the League functioned as it was sup­
posed to function* no longer be necessary, but' France and 
her allies.demanded more security than they felt the League 
offered before they would talk about disarmament. All 
negotiations came to nought during the 1920’s; their only 
result was to show that nations would still entrust their 
national interests only to their own armed forces. All this 
was grist for Hitler’s mill, and he was making much of the 
unfulfilled promise of the allies to disarm. When the League 
finally called a disarmament conference in 1932 a deadlock 
ensued and, when nothing had been accomplished by Octo-
13
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ber 1933, Hitler, who was now in power, used this failure 
as an excuse to withdraw Germany from both the conference 
and the League.
ECONOMIC NATIONALISM
Nationalism was also reflected in the economic policies of 
nearly all countries. Tariff barriers, erected during the 
1920’s, checked the interchange of goods and made the prob­
lem of paying war debts, which in themselves were enough 
to keep national feelings at a high pitch, even more difficult. 
The depression which struck in the early 1930’s only made 
matters worse as each country raised its tariff still higher. 
Even Great Britain, the stronghold of free trade, finally 
turned to a tariff. The climax came when a World Eco­
nomic Conference, meeting in London in 1933, collapsed 
chiefly because no one was willing to make any concessions.
TODAY AND TOMORROW
In the last analysis democracy was completely over­
shadowed by nationalism even in what appeared to be the 
hour of its triumph. The two ideas which had fought side 
by side were not able to share the victory. Over 80 years 
ago, at a time when these ideas still appeared to be allied, the 
English scholar, Lord Acton, in a remarkable analysis which 
has turned out to be almost a prophecy wrote, “ Nationality 
does not aim either at liberty or prosperity, both of which it 
sacrifices to the imperative necessity of making the nation 
the mould and measure of the State. Its course will be 
marked with material as well as moral ruin, in order that a 
new invention may prevail over the works of God and the 
interests of mankind. There is no principle of change, no 
phase of political speculation conceivable, more comprehend 
sive, or more arbitrary than this. It is a confutation of 
democracy, because it sets limits to the exercise of the popu­
lar will, and substitutes for it a higher principle. It pre­
vents not only the division, but the extension of the State, 
and forbids to terminate war by conquest and to obtain 
security for peace.”
In the midst of a great war, the outcome of which is in
14
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doubt, it is difficult to offer a detailed solution to this prob­
lem, but the broad outlines at any rate can be drawn. Pre­
sumably, if Germany wins in Europe, that continent will be 
organized on the super-race principle, and very possibly the 
question of whether or not the world can exist “ half slave 
and half free” will be resolved only by a long struggle be­
tween the Old World and the New, fought at least in eco­
nomic, if not military, terms.
If, however, Nazism is defeated and the super-race theory 
is discredited, what then? Proposals concerning postwar 
plans may seem to be counting chickens before they are 
hatched, but a workable plan for world organization which 
will be acceptable to all nations cannot be drawn up over­
night. The old methods of large armaments and balance- 
of-power politics have obviously failed as preservers of 
either peace or of the permanent supremacy of any one na­
tion. It would, perhaps, be fatal to hopes for future civili­
zation if the world were to revert to these old methods 
merely because of the lack of an alternative.
There have already been several proposals made. One, 
Mr. Streit’s plan for “ Union Now,”  was made even before 
the present war broke out. This, briefly, proposes a union 
of the democracies of the world which would have a central, 
federal government, organized on democratic principles 
with sufficient authority and power to enforce its decisions. 
In the end, Mr. Streit envisages a world not dissimilar to 
the United States, a group of states each with its own gov­
ernment but each a part of a union to which all ultimate 
loyalties are given. Another proposal is a revival of the 
League of Nations with the changes which the experience 
of the past 20 years indicates are necessary if it is to succeed 
in a second try. Still another proposal is a plan for a United 
States of Europe similar to that proposed by Briand over a 
decade ago. Such an organization would be too limited in 
scope to be a guarantee of world peace, but Europe has been 
the cradle of the past world wars and, if peace could be pre­
served there, it would be an important step in the right 
direction.
These are the chief proposals that have been made, and
15
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very probably any plan that is adopted in the future will be 
some variation of one of these three. They may differ as to 
degree or methods of central government from the strong 
federal union of “ Union Now” to the loose federation of a 
revived League of Nations, but one thing seems to be clearly 
evident; if any plan of international organization is to 
succeed there must be considerable recasting of past and 
current ideas of what constitutes “national honor” and sov­
ereign rights. If every nation, or any one great nation, in­
sists that the maintenance of large armed forces, the privi­
lege of raising tariff barriers and the right to act as sole 
judge of its own actions are necessary requirements of its 
“ national honor” and are its sovereign rights, then Mr. 
Streit’s “ Union Now” is impossible, and any future League 
of Nations is doomed to the same tragic failure as its 
predecessor.
In the end it would seem to be a matter of mere common 
sense. Just as within a village community it is impossible 
to grant complete freedom to individuals without endanger­
ing the general welfare, so, no less in the community of 
nations, sacrifices on the part of each nation of what may 
have been in the past considered necessary rights and privi­
leges, will have to be made if the Civilization which we have 
inherited is to survive us.
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lege o f Agriculture and Mechanic Arts and the United States Department of Agricul­
ture Cooperating. Extension Service, R. K. Bliss, director, Ames, Iowa. Distributee 
in furtherance o f the Acts o f Congress of May 8 and June 30, 1914. .
Agricultural Experiment Station, Iowa State College o f Agriculture and Mechanic 
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